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Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Office of Internal Oversight Services

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the global audit of field security management

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Abbreviations

EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

Missions covered by the audit

Peacekeeping missions

MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

Political and peacebuilding missions

BONUCA	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOMB	United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville
UNOWA	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa
UNTOP	United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding

Summary

The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) conducted a global audit of field security management in 15 field missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 5 political and peacebuilding missions led by the Department of Political Affairs. OIOS planned and conducted the audits in close coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator* and the United Nations Development Programme. In assessing the effectiveness of field security management in those duty stations, the audit had one principal aim: to help enhance the security of United Nations personnel in the field during the current period of heightened risk.

OIOS provided the Secretary-General with the summary of the main findings, which were generally in line with those contained in the report of the Secretary-General on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59/365 and Corr.1 and A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1).

The audit found that basic security arrangements exist or are currently being improved in the majority of the missions audited and that in some duty stations, good practices prevail. It also found that the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have recognized the need to strengthen security management and in recent years had established some cooperative methods for doing so.

However, the audit showed a considerable need for improvements in the following areas: (a) security structures, both at Headquarters and in the field; (b) security plans and policies and their implementation; (c) deployment and administration of personnel; (d) budgeting and resourcing; (e) coordination with the host Government and the external military force and among United Nations agencies; and (f) physical security.

A related conclusion is that it does not appear to be sound practice for the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, a sizeable entity staffed largely with security professionals (including seven posts funded under the support account for peacekeeping operations, to provide advice and assistance on security in field missions led by the Department), to be responsible for the security of United Nations agencies in the field, while the Department, whose security staff is minuscule in comparison, is responsible for the security of tens of thousands of peacekeeping staff.

While the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have implemented some security changes and issued the number of special security guidelines since the attack against United Nations offices in Baghdad, the audit found that five months after the release of the report of the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel, many of the shortcomings identified by the Panel still need to be addressed.

The major audit findings of OIOS in each area needing improvement include the following:

Security structure

- Roles and responsibilities of various security governing bodies and staff needed clarification.
- There is a need to re-examine the countrywide security organization in various countries, which has in some cases led to confusion.
- Reporting lines of security officers were not clearly defined.

Coordination with the host Government and external military forces and among United Nations agencies

- In some duty stations, no official memorandum of understanding or protocol (status of forces/mission agreement) on security issues was signed with the host Government and/or the external military forces.
- A frequent pattern was poor attendance by agencies at countrywide security management team meetings.

Security plans and policies and their implementation

- In some duty stations, the security plan was either incomplete or out of date. Also, in many cases, security plans were not tested or rehearsed.
- The security warden system, in some missions, was deficient. Internal communications between staff and the mission security section was poor. There was not enough awareness of the importance of security arrangements among United Nations personnel in some duty stations.
- There is a need to review the mechanism for declaring security phases.
- Minimum operating security standards recommended by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator had not yet been established by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as a policy requirement for missions led by the Department.

Budgeting and resourcing

- Some missions had insufficient resources to ensure compliance with security requirements.
- No separate budget line was established for security costs in mission budgets for proper planning and monitoring of resources provided and expenditures made.

Deployment and administration of personnel

- A common pattern in many missions was a significant number of vacancies in the posts allocated for security section. The vacancy rate varied from 39 to 86 per cent, and in some missions vacancies remained open for two years.
- Security training for designated officials, some members of the security management team and staff with security responsibilities was often inadequate. Also, in some missions, staff members (up to 80 per cent of interviewed personnel) have not completed the basic security training developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

Physical security

- In some missions, security arrangements for officials designated as "at risk" were inadequate; close protection was not always provided to high-ranking officials and security guards were not armed.
- Perimeter security in many missions needed improvement.
- In some missions, access control procedures relating to visitors' identification, registration and physical screening needed to be improved.

OIOS makes a series of recommendations to the Secretary-General, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations which, if implemented, would improve the security of United Nations personnel and facilities in the field.

* By section XI of its resolution 59/276 of 23 December 2004, the General Assembly decided to establish the Department of Safety and Security, replacing the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

I. Introduction

1. While the primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations personnel and of its assets rests with the Government of the host country, each mission and agency of the United Nations system is responsible for establishing security arrangements commensurate with their operational responsibilities within the framework of the United Nations field security management system.

2. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the security and safety of peacekeeping personnel, while the United Nations Security Coordinator provides him with the necessary technical advice and assistance to discharge that responsibility. For that purpose, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has been allocated posts under the support account for peacekeeping operations. These currently comprise five Professional and two General Service posts to deal with security management in peacekeeping operations. From its inception until March 2002, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was not involved to any marked extent in security management issues. All support to the missions was provided directly by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. Relations at Headquarters were mostly confined to contacts at the desk officer level on an ad hoc basis. In response to this unsatisfactory situation, the Department commissioned an independent study in April/May 2001, which provided it with a list of urgent recommendations to strengthen security management in the field. One outcome was the informal designation of the Chief of the Department's Situation Centre as focal point for security in March 2002. Although approval of a full-time post for that purpose is still pending, the part-time arrangement has enabled the Department to start developing a modest capacity for dealing with security management issues, based on close coordination with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

3. In view of the high risks resulting from the changing security environment and the growing concern with respect to the security and safety of United Nations personnel and assets worldwide, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) in close coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and a security expert acting at the time as a temporary consultant to the Deputy Secretary-General, identified the need to review global field security procedures as a matter of priority.

4. OIOS conducted its audit from May to July 2004 at 15 missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 5 led by the Department of Political Affairs. OIOS assessed the security procedures in place, the level of coordination between entities involved in security operations, and the adequacy of security staffing resources; and determined whether there were problems that prevented the missions and offices from implementing their security and emergency planning mandates.

5. A draft of the present report was transmitted to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for review. Their comments have been incorporated in the report, where appropriate, and are shown in italics.

II. Background

6. The Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General have issued several policy documents recognizing the paramount importance of the security and safety of United Nations personnel. In one of these documents, dated 28 August 2002 (A/57/365), the Secretary-General set out an inter-organizational security framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system. The document outlines the responsibilities of the various entities and individuals within the United Nations system of organizations involved in security management.

7. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator is responsible for developing and coordinating policy guidelines for all United Nations establishments/missions. The United Nations Security Coordinator acts on behalf of and reports directly to the Secretary-General to ensure a coherent response by the United Nations to any emergency situation. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator works closely with other departments that are involved in security management, including the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for providing overall guidance and specific directives for ensuring the security and safety of all personnel — civilian, police and military — and assets deployed to missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The Safety and Security Service manages the security of United Nations facilities around the world, and provides close protection to senior United Nations staff members. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes also operate complementary security management structures within their operations.

8. While the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for the security and safety of peacekeeping personnel, the United Nations Security Coordinator provides him with the necessary technical advice and assistance to discharge that responsibility. To develop standard operating procedures and provide training in some of the critical security management areas, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations organized three security workshops for chief security officers in peacekeeping missions in July 2002, August 2003 and June 2004. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator has developed the risk management doctrine, which serves as the basis for the Organization's policy on risk management, and issued the minimum operating security standards.

9. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also initiated changes in its security operations in peacekeeping missions with the issuance by the Department of a new policy and standard operating procedures for a trial period of one year effective October 2003. In December 2003, the Department issued a field security policy for implementation in peacekeeping missions, and in January 2004, it initiated a mission security management programme, which is being developed as a management tool to assist those responsible and accountable for the security of the Department's personnel and assets to carry out their responsibilities. As indicated in the field security policy, the mission security management programme incorporated policy, direction, guidance, and procedures issued under the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations.

10. In his report dated 11 October 2004 on a strengthened and unified security management system for the United Nations (A/59/365) the Secretary-General proposed major changes to the existing security organization at the United Nations Secretariat and an increase in the number of security personnel, particularly in the field. OIOS provided the Secretary-General with a summary of the main findings of the global audit, which were generally in line with those contained in the report of the Secretary-General. The current report is intended to further complement the report of the Secretary-General by presenting the OIOS findings from the perspective of the security conditions found to exist in the field.

III. Security structure issues

A. Different security structures exist in the field

11. The audit noted that different security structures prevailed in the 20 duty stations reviewed. In some cases, the heads of missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are appointed as designated officials for the entire country (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) and United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)) and in other cases they are appointed only for the mandated area of operation of the mission, e.g., the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Finally, in some cases, the head of mission is not appointed as designated official, but, instead, a deputy special representative of the Secretary-General or a country representative of an agency, fund or programme is named.

12. While OIOS focused on security arrangements within peacekeeping and political missions, the audits did take note of the broader presence of other agencies, such as UNDP, the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), operating within each of the countries visited. While the extent of administrative dependency on UNDP may vary from country to country, all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes are members of the United Nations field security management system and therefore fall under the authority of the designated official.

13. All of the "in country" agencies and organizations are part of the United Nations field security management system, yet security of United Nations personnel and assets is disparate among United Nations agencies/programmes and missions. The separation of peacekeeping security from the United Nations field security management system is a historical approach that increases the probability of uneven implementation of the United Nations security policy. As stated in August 2003 by a team of consultants in its report on the evaluation of United Nations security arrangements, "there must be one United Nations Security policy ...", and "... there needs to be one office as a central and coordination office for the three current forms of delivering security, i.e., at Headquarters, in the field for agencies and for peacekeeping". OIOS is pleased to note that as a result of the recent review by the Deputy Secretary-General of documents A/59/365 and Corr.1 and A/59/365/Add.1 and Corr.1, the need for consolidation in the delivery of security services is now being addressed by the Organization's security governing bodies.

B. Roles and responsibilities in establishing and implementing security policies and procedures need clarification

14. Some missions experienced difficulties in identifying and clearly understanding the roles of various security governing bodies and individuals. There was also some confusion as to whether the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations security standards and operational guidelines should be applied in areas where both peacekeeping missions and other United Nations organizations operate. Some missions expressed the concern that the responsibilities of the Department and the Office were not adequately clarified with regard to performance and oversight of field security and that the guidance they provided to the field missions lacked cohesion.

15. For example, on 15 September 2002, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator addressed a letter to all designated officials, field security coordinators and security focal points, stating that "one of the factors that became extremely clear during the recent risk and threat assessment exercise which was conducted on an inter-agency basis was the fact that many duty stations are still not minimum operating security standards compliant". The Office requested each duty station to provide a detailed report, by 22 September 2002, on those areas where the duty station was not minimum operating security standards compliant.

16. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations subsequently contacted all chief security officers in the peacekeeping missions, noting that the request of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator did not apply to the peacekeeping component for which the issuance of the directive was the clear prerogative of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. In that regard, OIOS noted that the minimum operating security standards recommended by the Office had not been established by the Department as a policy requirement for the missions it led.

17. In the opinion of OIOS, the lack of clear leadership at Headquarters regarding field security matters creates confusion. There is a need for uniform security standards and an established compendium of procedures comprising all security-related policies and procedures in order to facilitate their consistent implementation and monitoring. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator in security-related matters in peacekeeping missions is dependent on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations instructing the peacekeeping missions to implement recommendations of the Office.

18. The roles and responsibilities of the security bodies within the mission area of operations need to be clarified. For example, the responsibility of security personnel of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator in Afghanistan and those of the UNAMA security staff need to be clearly defined, to avoid duplication of efforts in the region. Similarly, in the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), confusion existed about the roles of the head of the mission and the designated officials for Pakistan and India, concerning security matters.

19. In some long-established missions, the security organizational structure requires the establishment of a civilian security post. There is a need for a thorough review of the roles and responsibilities to be assigned to the new civilian field security officer and his/her place in the overall security structure in relation to the

head of mission, the chief administrative officer and the military, to ensure the continued coordinated execution of the security programme in field missions.

C. Appointment of designated officials and their deputies needs to be reviewed

20. In each country where the United Nations has a presence, one official is appointed as the designated official for security. This official is accountable to the Secretary-General through the United Nations Security Coordinator. Depending on the particular circumstances at the duty station, the heads of peacekeeping missions or other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes may also be appointed as designated officials.

21. However, the administrative structures for providing security differed in several countries. For example, there were two designated officials with different areas of responsibility in Eritrea (UNMEE), and several deputy designated officials in Israel and the autonomous territories. In the opinion of OIOS, the existence of two designated officials or several deputy designated officials in the same area of operations has had an adverse impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of the security programme. The respective roles of two designated officials in Eritrea, for instance, needed to be clarified since the audit found that it caused confusion in the authority to declare or revise security phases in the country. In the opinion of OIOS, the appointment of three deputy designated officials and two field security coordination officers for various areas in Israel and the autonomous territories also needs reconsideration as it is not consistent with the United Nations security management accountability framework, which does not provide for such security structures.

22. OIOS further noted that UNDP resident representatives, appointed as designated officials in some countries, had limited operational and financial ability to implement and oversee the security programme, since the countrywide security plan, in such cases, was entirely dependent on the peacekeeping mission located in the region. OIOS believes that there is a need to reconsider the appointment of the designated officials in some duty stations based on the security-related resources of the missions or offices in the particular country.

D. Composition and performance of security management teams need to be improved

23. A security management team consists of the country representatives of each United Nations agency, fund, programme and mission present at the duty station, who advise the designated official on all security-related matters. Generally, OIOS found that the composition of the teams was adequate. However, in some countries, they did not include representatives of all United Nations organizations and agencies at the duty station.

24. The composition of security management teams varied. Some missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have their own mission security management team or security management committee apart from the countrywide team, and other country operations had one security management team. This

resulted in the need for more coordination between the security management teams on a mission and countrywide level. Also, some mission teams needed to revise their composition and to strongly reaffirm their responsibilities (UNMEE and MINURSO).

25. One of the main responsibilities of security management team's members is to meet on a regular basis to review the prevailing situation and ensure that security is being managed effectively at the duty station. The security management team is also responsible for establishing minimum operating security standards at the duty station and monitoring its implementation. In some duty stations, security management teams were not successful in carrying out their mandated responsibilities, as follows:

(a) Security management team's meetings were not regularly convened and were not being attended by all members, and heads of agencies were frequently absent from the meetings in some duty stations (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and United Nations agencies in Israel and the autonomous territories);

(b) Minimum operating security standards and minimum operating residential security standards had not yet been fully established in many missions; in addition, the application of minimum operating residential security standards needed clarification;

(c) No timeline was set for the implementation of minimum operating security standards in 9 out of 20 audited field missions.

26. One of the common problems was a lack of monitoring of the implementation of minimum operating security standards. For example, the auditors reviewed the revised minimum operating security standards for Liberia for compliance and found that, while there were 77 categories of items in the revised standards, the mission had not complied fully with 21 items. In some duty stations, country-specific standards were not yet approved by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, and hence had not yet been implemented.

27. At UNMEE, a detailed review of the mission security management team's performance against the mandated responsibilities identified the following problems:

(a) Major security policy issues, e.g., the new Department of Peacekeeping Operations policy and standard operating procedures, were not tabled as an agenda item in the mission security management team meetings;

(b) There was no evidence that the mission team had discussed or reviewed the security plan and its rehearsal to ensure that it was functioning and effective;

(c) The Mission did not have an up-to-date list of its personnel. There was no documentation to show that the team had either reviewed or discussed this matter in any of its meetings;

(d) The audit team's survey of the zone wardens indicated that they were neither trained nor equipped to carry out their responsibilities;

(e) There was no evidence that the mission security management team monitored and ensured compliance with minimum operating security standards;

(f) The security management team did not maintain minutes of its meetings.

28. In the opinion of OIOS, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should draw attention of the respective designated officials and heads of the mission to unsatisfactory performance when the security management teams do not fully carry out their duties.

29. It should also be noted that neither the report of the Secretary-General of 28 August 2002 (A/57/365), nor the United Nations *Field Security Handbook* delineated clearly the roles and responsibilities of the mission security management teams and their coordination with the countrywide security management teams. There is a need to specify in the United Nations security policy documents the mission security management team's objectives and terms of reference.

E. Mission security sections need to be reorganized

30. In such missions as UNMISET, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS), UNMOGIP and the United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA), security organization and responsibilities generally complied with the accountability framework for the United Nations field security management system. However, the security sections' organizational structure in some missions needed significant improvements, including the exercise of required oversight by senior mission officials and effective management of day-to-day security operations. Also, the security control environment and the mission security standard operating procedures needed to be re-examined to consider the broad spectrum of mission operations. In some cases, missions have different security operations and structures depending on who performs the security functions, military or civilian personnel.

31. OIOS made a number of observations concerning security organization arrangements and established models. Problems at some duty stations are outlined below:

(a) At the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and UNIFIL the absence of a civilian mission security officer position and the short-term military rotation policy, coupled with a shortage of senior military officers, seriously jeopardized efforts by the force commander and head of mission to develop, implement and sustain an effective mission and countrywide security management programme. OIOS was pleased to note that on 18 June 2004, the General Assembly, in its resolutions 58/306 and 58/307 endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for funding additional chief of security posts at these missions;

(b) At the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), there was no documented management framework linking the chief security officer, the chief military observer and chief of civilian police regarding the implementation of security policy in the case of a crisis. Such a framework should link the structure, coordination of roles, information sharing and actual operating methods to ensure an adequate management response in case of an emergency;

(c) The presence of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East within the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) headquarters compound in Jerusalem requires administrative review, to determine the extent to which this may pose a security risk.

32. While some missions have a civilian security section, in other missions, military personnel essentially perform the security functions. The situation has led to the disparate application of standard operating procedures. In this regard, responsibilities within the new structures/security organization models envisaged by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need to be revisited, especially insofar as security in older missions will be "jointly" managed by military and civilian personnel. Command, control and accountability of the security management programme need to be clarified at UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and UNMEE. Further, the Department's policy does not address how military and civilian security capabilities are forged into an effective security command and control structure under the chief security officer.

33. OIOS observed that the planning, coordination and control of the security function needed improvement to ensure the capability and readiness of the mission's security components to perform their mandate (UNFICYP, UNIFIL and UNTSO).

34. Organizational problems regarding security in some missions were also caused by a poor appreciation of the importance of security (UNOWA, UNMEE). In the opinion of OIOS, the heads of missions must provide stronger leadership and more active direction and oversight to ensure implementation of an effective mission security programme.

F. Appropriate reporting lines and procedures need to be established

35. The OIOS review of reporting procedures in mission security frameworks found that accountability needed to be improved in such missions as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). For example, according to the standard operating procedures, the chief security officer serves as the mission security adviser with direct access to the head of mission on all security-related matters. He/she heads the security section under the supervision of the director of administration. However, OIOS found that the chief security officers did not report to and were not evaluated by the respective heads of missions in these missions. In addition, there was confusion and reluctance, on the part of some chief administrative officers, to implement fully this reporting requirement.

36. Moreover, the chief security officers were often classified at "lower" grade level job categories (some at the FS-5/4 level and some in the P-4/3 level). In addition, the current recruitment practice of selecting ex-military officers for Professional category security posts such as chief security officers, without simultaneously addressing the requirements of the security function, including apparent disparities in "position classifications to actual responsibilities", was creating an undercurrent of personnel dissatisfaction within the security staff community in some missions.

37. While the composition of the military units dedicated to security planning, facilities security and investigations generally complied with the requirements set out in the generic structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, there was a need, in some missions, such as UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNTSO and UNFICYP, to define military and civilian coordination, reporting lines, and accountability for each security component.

38. Another reporting issue observed at UNMEE and UNTSO related to security accountability at the countrywide level. There was little awareness in the missions of the accountability and working relationships with regard to the roles played by the designated officials for the country and individual sectors/regions.

IV. Coordination with host Governments, external military forces and among United Nations security entities

39. OIOS reviewed the coordination among the security entities at the duty stations. Generally, inter-agency coordination was inadequate and communication and cooperation with host Governments and other security partners needed strengthening at MINURSO, UNMIK, UNOGBIS and UNAMA. It should be noted, however, that in some duty stations, such as UNMISET and UNMOGIP, coordination between the agencies and with the host government was satisfactory. For example, a weekly briefing was made to the Government by the head of the mission in UNMISET on security-related issues. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIK had undertaken a major overhaul of its security procedures. The Department further stated that that included strengthening the coordination with United Nations agencies, the civilian police and the Kosovo Force. The Department also clarified that the local authorities did not have responsibilities in the reserved area of security and the rule of law in general, as UNMIK fulfilled the governance role as mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 1244 (1999) of 10 June 1999.*

40. While the primary responsibility for the security of United Nations staff members and property in the country rests with the host Government, in six duty stations no official memorandum of understanding or protocol for assisting the mission in case of a crisis had been signed with the host Government. There was a need to negotiate or renegotiate with foreign embassies and other partners involved in the plan to secure safe havens, regrouping points, and evacuation means such as air or sea transportation (MINURSO, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and UNOGBIS). For example, MINURSO should improve its internal coordination as well as coordination with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and local authorities on security matters such as preparing and formalizing an evacuation plan (through Algeria) for the liaison office at Tindouf.

41. In another case, there was a perception that the evacuation of United Nations personnel will be managed and arranged by the French forces stationed in Dakar. However, in his interview with the audit team, the commander of the French forces clarified that the priority for evacuation is French citizens followed by European Union (EU) nationals. Assistance to all others, including United Nations staff, would be dependent on their capacity to assist at that stage. He also added that there was no standing agreement with either the United Nations or any other country, and

if the United Nations required evacuation of its staff in an emergency, it should obtain a formal agreement at the highest levels in New York Headquarters. OIOS also observed a similar situation in UNAMA. There was no formal protocol with the Coalition Forces, the combat arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for providing security assistance to United Nations personnel.

42. Also, coordination of the security function within some missions needed significant improvement to ensure the capability and readiness of the missions' security section in performing its mandate and the operational application of the accountability framework (UNMEE, UNDOF and UNTSO). The audit teams made specific recommendations in their respective reports issued in the field concerning improved coordination.

43. Coordination between the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on security policy issues also needed improvement. For example, on 22 April 2004, the Office approved minimum operating residential security standards for Eritrea with immediate effect. However, the directive was referred to the Department's Security Operations for an opinion as to its "applicability for UNMEE" only on 27 May 2004.

V. Security plans and policies and their implementation

A. Security plans need to be developed and tested

44. The security plan is the main component of the security system and the primary management tool for security preparedness at the duty station. In missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the security plan is the main part of the field security management programme, initiated by the Department and presented to all heads of missions led by the Department in January 2004. In accordance with the requirements of the accountability framework for the United Nations field security management system (A/57/365), the designated official ensures the observance of the arrangements detailed in the United Nations *Field Security Handbook* and develops and implements the security plan for the duty station with the aim of maintaining the security and safety of the United Nations system personnel and operations. It should be noted, however, that the Department is still in the process of reviewing and incorporating peacekeeping personnel into the framework for accountability.

45. Most of the duty stations had security plans detailing the essential security elements, such as an evacuation plan, crises management plan and other established requirements. However, OIOS observed numerous cases of non-compliance with the provisions set out in the security plans and noted the following deficiencies that will hinder the plan's effectiveness in responding to a contingency, if not rectified immediately:

(a) While the standard operating procedures required that security plans in the area of operations need to be subjected to rigorous drill, evaluation and appropriate modification, in consultation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, many missions failed to meet the requirement;

(b) Drills and rehearsals to simulate emergency situations were not carried out in some missions;

(c) The security plans were not finalized or updated, in some cases, for more than one year;

(d) The standard operating procedures for an emergency situation and the crisis management plan, including such possible scenarios as kidnapping, death, arrest or detention of staff, were not developed;

(e) Evacuation and medical plans in some missions were not developed or rehearsed. The OIOS review showed that the evacuation plan had not been rehearsed in 17 missions, and the medical evacuation plan in 13 of the 20 audited duty stations;

(f) The medical and evacuation capability was often insufficient;

(g) Mission security procedures needed improvement in the areas of institutional framework, policy direction and implementation of security plans.

46. There were also critical observations attributable to missions and countrywide security plans. For example, UNOCI had no detailed mission-specific security plan and no formalization, documentation or dissemination of the processes and procedures for the mission security operations. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNOCI was currently reviewing its security plan to address the deficiencies highlighted by the draft report and expected to complete the project by 31 January 2005.* While the countrywide security plan for Israel and the autonomous territories was comprehensive and reflected contributions from 15 United Nations agencies and missions, there were agencies that remained outside the plan, unnecessarily putting their staff at risk.

47. The United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB) was not ready for an emergency situation owing to the following critical issues: an evacuation boat required repairs, fire extinguishers had not been maintained since 1998, telephone lines were sometimes out of order owing to late payment of bills and radio communication had not yet been commissioned. In the opinion of OIOS, these deficiencies require urgent management attention.

48. At UNMEE, the evacuation part of the security plan had not been updated or rehearsed since March 2002, which created a critical security risk. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that the UNMEE-wide security and evacuation plan, which was under revision at the time of the audit, had since been completed.* UNMIK had not developed a crises management plan or emergency procedures. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIK was in the process of further improving its crisis management plan, based on the lessons learned from the March 2004 violence and it had updated its mission-wide security plan and evacuation plan to accommodate the changing environmental factors.* Similar shortcomings were identified by the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel. In its 3 March 2004 report, the panel stated that "the lack of contingency planning by the United Nations for an attack with a large number of casualties manifested itself in the rescue mission. There was no systematic or organized response from staff members in relation to command posts, points of assembly or the tracking of casualties as they left the site either by their own means or by medical evacuation. There was also a shortage of medical supplies and first aid kits."

B. Security warden system needs to be improved and staff lists need to be updated on a daily basis

49. In its report, issued on 3 March 2004, the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel stated that "some agencies were in blatant non-compliance in relation to staff lists, which led to a difficult situation on 19 August when no one could give accurate numbers of the staff in the Canal Hotel or account for other staff in the country who could be in danger and might need to be evacuated". Although some time has passed since the Panel made its observation, the OIOS audit observed that this shortcoming has not been addressed in several missions.

50. Often lists of staff, including dependants, where applicable, and personnel contact information were either outdated or improperly maintained. For example, in UNMIK, the lists of personnel were prepared with a one-month delay. In UNMEE, 20 international civilian staff members, who had already left the mission, were on a main roster of international staff and on a list of essential international staff of the mission. In the opinion of OIOS, these identified shortcomings were caused by a poor security warden system. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMEE was in the process of updating its list of current staff members.*

51. The security warden system in 14 out of 20 audited missions was deficient or needed improvement. For example:

(a) The UNMIK warden system failed, during the March 2004 incidents, owing to a failure of communications and a lack of training/drills for the wardens and the staff. The UNOCI warden system was also found ineffective. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIK had updated and improved its warden system. The Mission has linked its check-in/check-out process with the system of the security section to provide an overview of the Mission's personnel, including the timely update of the warden system. Additionally, UNMIK has distributed hand-held radios to international and national staff members;*

(b) A radio check revealed that the whereabouts of more than 60 UNAMA staff in Kabul were unknown on any given day;

(c) Security wardens in UNMIL were not adequately trained and were appointed for zones other than their residence areas. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNMIL had prepared comprehensive briefing packages that were issued to all wardens. Every warden had been given a copy of the conceptual idea and general overview of the UNMIL-wide security plan.*

52. In some missions, staff members were not aware of their security wardens, and internal communications between staff and the mission security section was poor.

C. Determination of "security phases" needs to be clarified

53. The United Nations employs five specific security phases to describe the security measures to be implemented in a given country based on the prevailing security conditions. The designated official, after consultation with the security management team (for phases I and II) and authorization by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and by the Secretary-General (for phases III, IV and V), may declare the security phases in his/her respective region.

54. OIOS compared the security phases in several missions and noted a disparity in how security phases are determined. In addition, in some cases, missions in contiguous areas of conflict have different security phases, which were driven by factors having little to do with security, such as, family conveniences and monetary allowances, thus undermining the effectiveness and credibility of security objectives and inherent processes. For example, there are different phases in Israel/West Bank/Gaza, while the particular conflict is non-discriminatory as to where the violence or potential for violence may take place. In the opinion of OIOS, the UNTSO mission area of operations designated as security phase I needs to be reviewed, in the light of the continuously unsettled security environment in the region.

55. In another case, as indicated in paragraph 21 above, the unclear chain of command and reporting procedures between Headquarters and the security staff from different agencies and the failure of the two designated officials for security in Eritrea to coordinate and agree caused confusion as to who had the authority to declare or revise a security phase in the country and to approve staff members' non-duty travel to a phase III location.

56. For example, in February 2004, the country designated official declared the Asmara-Massawa road as phase III. On 25 February, the mission security management team discussed the implications of phase III, which was approved by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. The phase III announcement was viewed as negative since UNMEE staff travelled to Massawa for rest and recreation. The security team was concerned that the declaration would adversely affect civilian and military staff morale since the mission did not have the occasional recovery break privileges or alternative recreational options. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a designated official for the mission area of operations, designated the Asmara-Massawa road and the city of Massawa as part of the mission area, thereby nullifying the country designated official's declaration to phase III, effectively returning it to a phase I status. Mission personnel were allowed to travel to the area.

57. As a result, United Nations staff operated under different security phases in the same location for different United Nations organizations. *The Department of Safety and Security commented that the difficult situation had arisen from the arrangement made prior to the adoption of General Assembly resolution 59/276, section XI, whereby United Nations civilian staff members of peacekeeping missions did not fall under the authority of the designated official appointed under the aegis of the United Nations field security management system.* The decision of UNMEE to de facto ignore the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator phase III declaration in certain parts of Eritrea is similar to a criticism in the 20 October 2003 report of the Independent Panel on the Safety and Security of United Nations personnel in Iraq which stated that "United Nations security policies and decisions bear a definite political dimension that often supersedes the security interest involved in protecting its staff".

D. Minimum operating security standards need to be established by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator as a policy requirement for missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

58. As indicated in paragraph 16 above, although the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator had recommended the use of minimum operating security standards, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had not established minimum operating security standards as a policy requirement at Department-led missions. However, OIOS noted that minimum operating security standards requirements were being used by Department-led missions in implementing their security management programmes. As a result, the Department-led missions de facto use minimum operating security standards for implementation of their security programmes, while de jure they are not subject to the minimum operating security standards requirements.

VI. Budgeting and resourcing

59. The main concerns identified by OIOS at several missions, including the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), UNAMA, UNDOF, UNMEE, UNMIL and UNMIK, were the lack of resources to organize the security function in compliance with minimum operating security standards requirements, the standard operating procedures and field security policy of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the understaffing of skilled security personnel. As a result, the missions were not fully compliant with mandated security requirements and were not capable of effectively managing their security operations. OIOS is pleased to note that in his report dated 11 October 2004 (A/59/365) the Secretary-General stressed the need for a significant increase in the number of security personnel, particularly in the field, in order to provide an adequate level of security for United Nations staff working in various duty stations.

60. The OIOS review of budgeting for security requirements also showed that expected accomplishments, performance indicators and outputs relating to security were not included or clearly set out in the budget. These weaknesses in budget planning were observed at 17 duty stations, including MINURSO, UNMIL, the United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding (UNTOP), UNOMIG and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

61. Separate lines for security costs had not been established in the mission budgets. Allotted funds for security posts, training and equipment were included in the total amount of the mission's expenditure category. In the opinion of OIOS, the establishment of separate budget lines for security costs will facilitate the planning and monitoring of expenditures related to security operations in the missions.

62. In some cases, the mission improperly estimated their budget requirements. For example, UNMEE estimated the costs for relocating its headquarters in Asmara at $7 million, and submitted its proposal to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which approved it in June 2004. However, at the time of the audit, financial provisions for securing the new site had not been included in the approved amount. Also, the UNMEE Security Section was not included in the consultative process for selecting the new sites.

63. In another case, MINURSO requested a budget increase of about $3 million for fiscal year 2003/04 to cover the cost of 22 international staff posts and 45 national staff posts to strengthen the mission's security function as a result of a security technical review by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. However, there was no correspondence between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and MINURSO on this issue, and the request was apparently not answered by the Department.

64. In May 2003, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations instructed MINURSO to plan its requirements on the assumption that it would continue at its current strength. MINURSO informed OIOS that, based on this instruction, the mission had not requested additional security staff in its 2004/05 budget submission.

VII. Deployment and administration of personnel

A. Human resources management needs improvement

65. In several missions, staffing in the security sections was inadequate. The vacancy rate for the security functions varied from 39.6 per cent in UNMIL to 86.2 per cent in UNOCI. According to the Chief Security Officer in UNMIK, the Security Section was dangerously close to being ineffective owing to understaffing and the inappropriate security skills and experience of current staff. The performance of the security function was also hampered by the absence of a civilian mission security officer position in UNDOF, and by the absence of a qualified and competent security analyst in UNAMA.

66. Some missions had difficulties in the timely recruiting of skilled and experienced security personnel for various reasons such as the severity of conditions, low level post classification and inadequate compensation. In some missions, vacancies remained open for two years. The lack of funding was another reason for understaffing in some missions, such as MINURSO, UNOMB and UNMIK. Security resources were not always used efficiently. At UNTSO security personnel performed non-security-related functions.

B. Security training and staff awareness require more emphasis

67. Security and stress management training is mandatory for all designated officials and members of security bodies, who are responsible for ensuring that staff are provided with adequate training and are aware of security arrangements and procedures. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator provides specific training to the designated officials and members of security management teams at field locations, develops training programmes and issues information booklets on security issues for United Nations staff members. In 2003, the Office developed a training programme on basic security in the field, focusing on staff safety, health and welfare. This programme was designed to raise the awareness of staff members to potential dangers they may face in field missions. The Office and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations also organized regular training workshops for the chief security officers from all peacekeeping missions.

68. While OIOS acknowledges the efforts of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to develop and provide a continuous security programme, it found that training remained a major concern in many field missions. Some designated officials had not obtained proper training, and the security staff was not adequately trained. For example, the designated officials and the security management team members in UNMOGIP had not been provided with such training, and the UNOMIG security officers had not received sufficient training, other than firearms training.

69. OIOS also found that, although at majority of missions all staff members had received induction/orientation on security matters upon their arrival at the duty station, the level of staff awareness to potential threats and knowledge of security procedures was alarmingly low in some missions including UNOWA, UNMISET and UNMIL. For example, many UNMIL staff members were unfamiliar with the mission evacuation plan, did not know their security wardens and had not been briefed on security procedures. In UNMISET, 80 per cent of interviewed personnel had not completed the basic security training developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, following the audit, UNMISET had taken measures to ensure that all staff complied with the requirement to complete the security course and that more than 90 per cent of the Mission's staff members had completed the course as at 4 January 2005.*

70. In other missions, such as UNMEE, mission staff had not shown maturity or responsibility by actively considering advice provided by the security section that was relevant to their personal safety. Moreover, in some countries with no security phase (e.g., Senegal), management and staff did not fully appreciate the importance of the security function.

71. Improvement is also needed with regard to maintaining the database on lessons learned for the management and staff of the missions. Some missions had no centralized database of lessons learned/best practices. OIOS found that 14 of the 20 audited missions had no documented guidance for the identification of security-related lessons identified and best practices.

72. The above findings are similar to those identified by the Security in Iraq Accountability Panel, which stated in its report that "many staff members who were present in Baghdad at the time of the attack were not adequately trained or prepared for deployment in a combat zone. It is also apparent that before the attack, some staff ignored basic security instructions in relation to communications, travel and attending security briefings. Several agencies paid scant regard to basic security issues, like the completion of the CD-ROM on basic security and minimum operating security standards compliance. This made it extremely difficult for the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator staff to carry out their functions". OIOS is concerned with the lack of security training and inadequate staff awareness of security procedures in some missions. This creates a serious risk to the United Nations security programme, in general, and to personal safety of United Nations staff members in field missions, in particular.

73. In this regard, OIOS welcomes the constructive measures proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 11 October 2004 (A/59/365, para. 58) concerning the establishment and the oversight of a sustained and coherent security training programme aimed at multiple clients: the security officers at headquarters and field

duty stations, the designated officials, the security management teams and security-related training for United Nations staff in general.

VIII. Physical security

74. In some missions, security arrangements were insufficient for officials designated as "at risk" by virtue of their responsibilities; the close protection detail was not provided to high-ranking official(s) and security guards were not armed. Physical security arrangements were not fully in line with threat assessment at 10 duty stations. The OIOS review of physical security measures relating to safeguarding personnel and securing the United Nations premises identified weaknesses in the missions, as illustrated below.

A. Security of personnel needs strengthening

75. *High-level management was not adequately safeguarded.* In UNAMA, the security procedures of the Close Protection Unit, manned by the French army, had not been aligned with the security procedures of UNAMA/Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, compromising the personal security of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The audit also found that the Representative of the Secretary-General in BONUCA urgently needed additional protection.

76. *United Nations security personnel did not carry weapons.* While the Governments of Morocco and Algeria and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro (Frente Polisario) provide a police escort and security to the duty station, MINURSO security officers did not carry weapons, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General did not have a personal bodyguard. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator need to provide guidance regarding whether United Nations security officers should carry weapons. In 12 missions, there was no qualified weapon instructor to security staff.

77. *Access control was inadequate.* In some missions, access control procedures relating to visitors' identification, registration and physical screening needed to be improved. Inadequate access control was observed at 17 of the 20 audited duty stations. At UNMEE, poor control of identification cards had caused absence without leave and situations when terminated local staff continued to have access to UNMEE facilities and equipment. Access to the UNTOP building by visitors, who have unrestricted access, posed a risk of entry by individuals who could jeopardize the security of United Nations staff and facilities.

B. Securing of premises needs to be improved

78. *United Nations premises were inadequately secured.* In Zugdidi (UNOMIG), no blast proof protective film was installed on the windows of the office buildings, including the room where the military observers hold their meetings. Perimeter security and physical access control to the United Nations premises was inadequate in some missions, including UNFICYP, UNIFIL and UNAMA. *The Department of*

Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNIFIL and UNFICYP were in the process of strengthening their perimeter security and access controls throughout their mission areas.

79. *Non-compliance with minimum operating security standards requirements.* The 50-metre stand-off zone required by minimum operating security standards was not established in several missions (UNMIK and MONUC). In UNMEE, key installations central to evacuating United Nations staff (e.g., the Communication Centre and the United Nations airport at Asmara) have not received security improvements.

80. *Lack of devices for security protection.* At the Sukhumi airport, which is a main access point for UNOMIG, no X-ray machine had been installed for security purposes. UNOMIG had no equipment to detect letter bombs. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that UNOMIG had installed an X-ray machine at the Sukhumi airport and that the Mission was in the process of installing blast protection film in its offices at Zugdidi, which was expected to be completed in February 2005. Furthermore, UNOMIG had provided in its 2005/06 budget for equipment for detecting letter bombs.*

81. *Residential area was not adequately secured.* Only 4 of the 60 houses that accommodated UNAMA staff in Kabul have been certified as complying with minimum operating residential security standards.

82. In the opinion of OIOS, the above observations represent serious shortcomings in the physical security of United Nations personnel and premises which need to be corrected.

C. Security and protection equipment needs to be procured

83. OIOS also reviewed the adequacy of equipment for the security function in field missions (i.e., security and protection equipment, security devices, supply and medical kits, transportation and communication equipment). Some missions were adequately equipped with security supplies and devices; however, a lack of funding for the purchase of transportation, communication and other equipment and supplies for security purposes, as well as delayed procurement of the equipment, were the main areas of concern in several missions, including UNDOF, UNOCI, UNTSO, UNMIL and UNAMSIL. In the opinion of OIOS, these problems undermine the missions' capability to effectively discharge their security mandate.

84. For example, UNDOF required funding for equipment necessary for medical evacuation of personnel deployed in remote areas. In UNOCI, the acquisition of a significant amount of security equipment, including radios, needed to be completed. At the time of the audit, no security and safety equipment had been acquired by UNMIL, although it had requested such equipment from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in October 2003. The requisition was approved only in May 2004, and no action has been taken in relation to this requisition. Since the mission was in the last month of the budget period, the entire list of equipment was re-budgeted for the new accounting period.

85. In view of security phases at the above missions, OIOS is concerned about the lax attempts to procure the much-needed equipment. The above examples demonstrate the need for urgent measures on the part of the missions' management

to procure required equipment for the missions' security function. OIOS believes that the acquisition of security and safety equipment can be expedited through the more active use of the strategic deployment stock at Brindisi, Italy, and the use of system contracts.

IX. Recommendations

86. OIOS makes the following recommendations on the basis of its audit findings made during the global audit of field security management:[1]

Recommendation 1

87. The Secretary-General should issue a single policy document/manual incorporating all security-related directives and procedures in one compendium accessible by all entities of the United Nations system to facilitate the implementation and monitoring of security management programmes (AP2004/600/16/01) (paras. 14-17).

88. *The Department of Safety and Security, on behalf of the Secretary-General, commented that the recommendation was accepted in principle. An early task of the new Department of Safety and Security would be to survey and assess existing directives and procedures and to develop a work plan for their updating, expansion and, where appropriate, consolidation. As there was no dedicated functional capacity within the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for producing policies and procedures, and given the lead times in establishing and staffing the Department, it was unlikely that major work beyond a preliminary survey could commence before the last quarter of 2005.*

Recommendation 2

89. The Secretary-General should ensure that the roles and responsibilities of all individuals, who are expected to carry out security functions in the field are clearly formulated in the security policy documents, and that additional clarification on the functions of security officials are provided to the missions, when needed (AP2004/600/16/02) (paras. 18 and 19).

90. *The Department of Safety and Security, on behalf of the Secretary-General, accepted the recommendation and stated that the task had begun with the updating of the framework for accountability for the United Nations field security management system (A/57/365) as mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 59/276.*

Recommendation 3

91. The Secretary-General should ensure that the appointment of designated officials and their deputies is consistent with the United Nations security management accountability framework, and consideration needs to be given to security-related resources of the mission and managerial ability of the appointee to exercise security-related duties (AP2004/600/16/03) (paras. 20-22).

[1] The symbols in parentheses in this section refer to an internal code used by OIOS for recording recommendations and to related paragraphs of the report.

92. *The Department of Safety and Security, on behalf of the Secretary-General, accepted the recommendation and stated that it was an ongoing task. The Department intends to work closely with UNDP, which provided 85 per cent of designated officials, in improving selection and training.*

Recommendation 4

93. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should direct all designated officials and heads of mission to take urgent measures to improve security training for all levels of United Nations staff at duty stations and to increase staff awareness of the security arrangements (AP2004/600/16/04) (paras. 31 and 69-71).

94. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic training programmes were in place and that it was an ongoing task, the performance evaluation and management of which were expected to improve once the dedicated compliance, evaluation and monitoring unit had been established within the new Department.*

Recommendation 5

95. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should instruct the designated officials and heads of mission to ensure that the composition and performance of the security management teams at the countrywide and mission level met the requirements established in the relevant United Nations security policy documents (AP2004/600/16/05) (paras. 24-28).

96. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place.*

Recommendation 6

97. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should instruct the heads of mission and the designated officials to improve the warden system in their respective duty stations and to ensure that the missions maintain updated staff lists, including dependants where applicable, at all times showing the location and contact information for each person (AP2004/600/16/06) (paras. 49-52).

98. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place. The Department also commented that it had embarked on an information technology project that was intended, in due course, to be of assistance to both the field and Headquarters in enhancing security clearances and personnel tracking.*

Recommendation 7

99. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should establish a viable mechanism to ensure that the mission and countrywide security plans are complete, updated and tested, and report on non-compliance with those requirements to the Secretary-General (AP2004/600/16/07) (paras. 44-48).

100. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place. The new Department structure, once implemented in the course of the year 2005, would also relieve the regional desk officers in New York of training, compliance visits and other functional responsibilities, enabling them to focus more attention on the review of country security plans.*

Recommendation 8

101. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should ensure that the missions adhere to established guidelines and requirements for providing close protection to senior officials in peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions (AP2004/600/16/08) (paras. 75-77).

102. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the United Nations, as a whole, currently suffered from serious capacity and technical shortcomings in the realm of personal protection. The Department also indicated that rectifying the problem would be an important element of the Department work plan. While the problem was recognized as urgent, further analysis was required before the Department could posit milestones. In the interim, the Organization would have no option but to continue to rely in many countries on whatever assistance could be arranged, on a case-by-case basis, with Member States.*

Recommendation 9

103. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should request all designated officials and heads of mission to report on the measures taken to improve physical security in their respective areas of operations (AP2004/600/16/09) (paras. 74-82).

104. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that it was an ongoing task. The Division of Safety and Security Services, once established within the Department, would have as an early task the review and upgrading of policy, procedures, techniques and standards for physical security.*

Recommendation 10

105. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should, when establishing standard operating procedures for peacekeeping missions, address the diversity of security management programmes, the broad spectrum of mission operations, and security control environments depending on whether security functions are performed by military or civilian personnel (AP2004/600/16/10) (paras. 30-33).

106. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it looked forward to the guidance of the Department of Safety and Security on the establishment of standard operating procedures to address the diversity of security management programmes and the broad spectrum of mission operations based on the sets of standard operating procedures already implemented on a routine basis by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator for the agencies, funds and programmes.*

Recommendation 11

107. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should revise the relevant security documents to include the objectives and terms of reference for security management teams established at the mission level and their coordination with countrywide security management teams (AP2004/600/16/11) (para. 29).

108. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it would lend its support to the Department of Safety and Security in its effort to streamline the coordination of the various stakeholders at the country level.*

Recommendation 12

109. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should ensure the establishment of proper reporting lines and accountability mechanisms concerning security matters in field missions (AP2004/600/16/12) (paras. 35, 37 and 38).

110. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it was likely that the establishment of the Department of Safety and Security and the request by the General Assembly for the Secretary-General to present a report on an accountability framework for the United Nations security management system, as a whole, at the sixtieth session of the Assembly would introduce new elements in the reporting and accountability lines of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; however, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations believed that it was too early to assess the nature and extent of such changes.*

Recommendation 13

111. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should review the current practices for recruiting chief security officers, align position classifications to actual responsibilities to be performed by an incumbent and reassess the grades at which security officers are appointed (AP2004/600/16/13) (para. 36).

112. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, as was the case with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, the Department of Safety and Security would continue to play a major role in establishing the requirements and benchmarks as well as contributing to the selection and recruitment process of all security personnel to be deployed in peacekeeping operations. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations also stated that it recognized that there were difficulties in the timely recruitment of skilled and experienced personnel and that in order to meet the challenge of increased demands for existing, expanding and new peacekeeping operations, it maintained, in close consultation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, a roster of candidates for all levels in the security field.*

Recommendation 14

113. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should issue a directive to peacekeeping missions requiring them to use the minimum operating security standards, as developed by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, when implementing their respective security management programmes (AP2004/600/16/14) (paras. 26 and 58).

114. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that, in coordination with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, it was in the process of finalizing a draft of mission-specific minimum operating security standards for peacekeeping operations. The Department further stated that while it understood that in the future, the Department of Safety and Security would have the responsibility for establishing the security standards to which civilian staff must abide in peacekeeping operations and ensure their compliance to such standards, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations intended to issue its minimum operating security standards as an interim measure.*

Recommendation 15

115. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should request the Controller to establish separate budget lines in peacekeeping missions' budgets for the security function, to facilitate the planning and monitoring of expenditures related to security operations (AP2004/600/16/15) (paras. 60-62).

116. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations accepted the recommendation and stated that it would raise the subject with the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts.*

Recommendation 16

117. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should review obstacles that have resulted in understaffing of security posts and take immediate steps to recruit staff for vacant security officer posts (AP2004/600/16/16) (paras. 59, 63 and 64).

118. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that in order for the security focal point to monitor the status of the Department's security recruitment, it was now a requirement for the Personnel Management and Support Service to provide, on a monthly basis to the focal point, an update on the status of the Department's security recruitment for all international staff. The Department added that similar efforts were under way to ensure that missions' chief security officers provided the security personnel staffing list to the Department's security focal point on a monthly basis. However, the Department pointed out that the long-term success of its security staffing strategy depended on the capacity of the Department of Safety and Security to assume that responsibility from the two staff members in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations temporarily supporting the effort. The Department also indicated that the termination of the current arrangement in the Department would, within a few months, shift the entire responsibility of the day-to-day management of, and advice to, the Department's field security staff to the Department of Safety and Security.*

Recommendation 17

119. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should, in conjunction with the Procurement Service, streamline the procedure for acquiring essential security and safety equipment such as protection devices, supply and medical kits, transportation and communication equipment (AP2004/600/16/17) (paras. 76 and 77).

120. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that a two-phased security review of all peacekeeping missions had been conducted, with a view to identifying ways and means to strengthen the security management in peacekeeping*

missions, including the acquisition of essential security equipment. The Department added that it had adopted a systems contract approach for the procurement of security equipment.

Recommendation 18

121. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should ensure that the strategic deployment stocks at Brindisi, Italy, had essential security equipment available for rapid deployment to new missions (AP2004/600/16/18) (para. 83).

122. *The Department of Peacekeeping Operations commented that it had reviewed the composition of the strategic deployment stocks in July 2004 to reflect the changes in the global security environment, operational nature of peacekeeping activities, technological advances, discontinuation of particular products and changes in the business environment. The Department further stated that the strategic deployment stocks composition would be reviewed annually to ensure that the stock held to support rapid deployment was constantly updated and met the changing requirements. The Department also indicated that it had developed a list of security equipment items, which, once approved by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, would have an impact on the composition of strategic deployment stocks.*

Recommendation 19

123. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator should ensure that the designated officials take actions to improve coordination at the countrywide and mission level and to strengthen communication and cooperation with the respective host Governments and external military forces (AP2004/600/16/19) (paras. 39-42).

124. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted the recommendation and stated that the basic instructions and guidelines were in place. The Department added that regional desk officers at Headquarters, as they were freed of other tasks through the full implementation of the Department structure, would also be able to provide more sustained and focused supervision to the specific security management arrangements of individual countries.*

Recommendation 20

125. The Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator should clarify the authority and mechanisms regarding the declaration and revision of security phases (AP2004/600/16/20) (paras. 20 and 53-57).

126. *The Department of Safety and Security accepted in part the recommendation and stated that the criteria, authority and mechanisms for declaring and revising security phases were set out in the United Nations* Field Security Handbook. *The Department further stated that the principal difficulty was lack of capacity at Headquarters to review security phases on a regular basis so as to ensure that they remained commensurate with the activities, and associated threats and risks, of the United Nations presence and activities in every country or portion thereof.*

(*Signed*) **Dileep Nair**
Under-Secretary-General
Office of Internal Oversight Services

United Nations A/59/703

General Assembly

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Fifty-ninth session
Agenda item 123
Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Analysis of establishing a global procurement hub for all peacekeeping missions in Brindisi, Italy

Report of the Secretary-General*

Summary

The Secretary-General, in his report of 7 April 2004 to the General Assembly (A/58/762), examined the merits of establishing a global procurement hub as well as relocating certain logistics functions, including communication and information technology, to the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB), located in Brindisi, Italy. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, during its follow-up discussion with the representatives of the Secretary-General and in its subsequent report (A/58/796), requested the Secretary-General conduct a detailed review of the operational implications and a cost-benefit analysis of various options for redeployment of functions and posts from United Nations Headquarters in New York to UNLB. The Advisory Committee also asked that the input of key related interlocutors or clients be taken into account. This request was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 58/297.

The Secretary-General has conducted a comprehensive review, involving all stakeholders, of the multidimensional implications of relocation of procurement and logistics functions to UNLB, taking into consideration the current volatile operational environment as well as the evolving role of UNLB in support of peace operations. To ensure the thoroughness of the review, the Secretary-General also engaged the services of an international consulting firm to conduct an independent study of the operational efficiencies and financial costs and to address the specific comments and questions contained in document A/58/796.

* The late submission of the report is attributable to time taken to ensure a comprehensive report on this issue.

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The present report, supported by the independent analysis and data of the external consultants, reinforces the conclusions contained in document A/58/762 and finds that it would be neither operationally advantageous nor cost-effective to relocate logistics and procurement functions from New York to UNLB.

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I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, in its report on the support account for peacekeeping operations for 2003/04 (see A/57/776, para. 99), requested that a comprehensive examination be conducted of the merits of establishing a global procurement hub for all peacekeeping missions at UNLB in Brindisi, transferring both posts and non-post resources financed from the support account at Headquarters and retaining only a few posts in New York for policy and liaison functions. The Committee made a similar request in its report on UNLB for 2003/04, with reference to communication and information technology (see A/57/772/Add.9, para. 22). The General Assembly endorsed those requests in its resolutions 57/318 and 57/320.

2. On 7 April 2004, the Secretary-General submitted his report (A/58/762) to the Committee on the subject of establishing a global procurement hub in Brindisi.

3. Consequent to its review of document A/58/762 and follow-up discussions with the representatives of the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee requested that a new report be prepared and that it examine in particular issues relating to organizational and operational efficiency and include responses to a number of specific requirements contained in paragraph 3 of the Committee's report (A/58/796). The General Assembly endorsed the request in its resolution 58/297.

4. In order to ensure a report that would fully respond to the observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee, the Secretary-General conducted a comprehensive review, involving all stakeholders, of the multidimensional implications of relocation of procurement and logistics functions to Brindisi in a peacekeeping operational environment marked by risk and volatility, also taking into account the evolving role of UNLB in support of field missions, particularly in the context of strategic deployment stocks operations. As a part of this review, and in order to ensure an independent, objective and comprehensive review of the issue, the Secretary-General engaged an external international consulting firm.

5. The present report is structured to specifically address the issues raised by the Advisory Committee. It provides the Secretary-General's observations arising from the consultant's report, and includes comments from the UNLB Steering Committee.

II. Methodology of the comprehensive review

6. The review was conducted on the basis that the primary measure of operational effectiveness was the extent to which any changes made would translate into improved service and support for peacekeeping missions in the evolving operational environment. It was also assumed that the affected departments and offices would have the necessary lead time to adapt their organizations and processes to the post-relocation set-up. This would include reallocation of responsibilities and transfer of skills to allow the separation and relocation of the functions identified. This assumption allowed the analysis to take a more flexible view of the various roles and responsibilities, without being bound by the specific skill sets and experience of individuals serving in the units at present.

7. Particular focus was placed on the operational linkages and interdependencies between the Headquarters-based procurement and logistics functions and those

currently being carried out at UNLB. On the basis of the linkages identified, it was found that the integrity and efficiency of the requisitioning and procurement processes benefit from their being co-located. In order to identify the functions of the Procurement Division of the Department of Management and the Logistics Support Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations that could be relocated, extensive consultations were conducted within the Secretariat, including with senior management, field missions and other United Nations departments. It was on this basis that the cost effectiveness of relocating to UNLB was examined.

8. In addition, the impact of relocation — and transient disruption — on the overall operational effectiveness of the delivery of support to field operations was examined, particularly with respect to the efficiencies of the affected entities, including:

(a) The recent increase in the demands on logistics and procurement functions supporting peacekeeping operations, due primarily to the rapid deployment or expansion of six missions in the last two years;

(b) The ongoing effort to further restructure and consolidate logistics and procurement functions, including integration of business processes and upgrading of information technology systems;

(c) The integration of the mission planning and deployment processes and the resulting evolution of integrated logistics, operations, military and police planning groups and deployment activities and processes;

(d) The plans for future expansion of the role of UNLB in support of peace operations, in particular with regard to strategic deployment stocks operations.

III. Responses to specific questions raised by the Advisory Committee

9. The responses of the Secretary-General to the issues raised by the Advisory Committee in paragraph 3 of its report (A/58/796) are set out below.

- **Identification of the functions that could be transferred to UNLB**
- **An assessment of the impact of relocation of those functions on the delivery of logistics support**
- **A comprehensive matrix of the advantages and disadvantages of the transfer and its impact on the activities of the related departments, divisions and other clients involved with the functions**

10. The Secretary-General finds that the procurement and logistics operational functions should be co-located owing to their close interdependence, and concludes that the nature and frequency of interactions and coordination between requisitioners and procurement rules out the option of geographically separating them without substantial adverse impact on organizational effectiveness. This finding was fully validated by the independent consultants.

11. Similarly, the Secretary-General finds that the relocation of functions would imply a division of the procurement function, which would result in (a) a duplication of functions in both locations; (b) a need to reconfigure the procurement

management structure; and (c) a requirement to relocate or duplicate other related support functions, such as those of the Headquarters Committee on Contracts, the Office of Legal Affairs, and accounts payable. The review further concluded that certain management and oversight functions, such as those provided by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, may also need to be duplicated at both Headquarters and UNLB. The relocation of procurement functions would also negatively affect communication with some outside interlocutors, such as other United Nations entities, contractors, permanent missions and the commercial sections of the consulates of Member States. The consultant's independent study supports this finding.

12. The consultant's findings show that elements of peacekeeping training functions could potentially be relocated to Brindisi. The Secretary-General does not support this proposal on a number of grounds:

(a) The negative factors applying to the relocation of Headquarters posts relating to procurement and logistics, such as difficulties in retaining high-quality staff for sustained periods, apply equally to training staff;

(b) The training section has strong linkages to policy development in the personnel area, and its activities require regular interactions with multiple Headquarters-based stakeholders (e.g. the Office of Human Resources Management, other departments, Member States and legislative bodies);

(c) Increased usage of UNLB as a preferred training site is already being addressed by the proposed establishment of a training presence in UNLB. This would ensure consistent delivery of a number of department-wide training initiatives and rapid response to training needs in-mission. Proposals to that end are reflected in the UNLB budget submission for the year 2005/06 (see A/59/691).

13. A table identifying the functions and a comprehensive matrix of the advantages and disadvantages of such a transfer and its impact on the activities of the related departments, divisions and other clients involved with the functions are attached to the present report as annexes I and II, respectively.

- **An identification of the number of posts related to the functions that would need to be relocated and the impact on units releasing the functions or posts**

- **The infrastructure required at UNLB to receive the transfer of the functions and posts, including such issues as accommodation, medical facilities, schools and security matters**

- **The potential budgetary impact of relocation, including numbers of posts and requirements for start-up of relocation, refurbishment and staff entitlements**

14. Recognizing the critical linkages among the key stakeholders in the Secretariat, the consultants determined that the establishment of a consolidated hub would require the relocation of about 130 posts. The Secretary-General notes that the division of cohesive units would disrupt the operational output of the units releasing the posts and severely curtail management's ability to realign staff resources to efficiently address surge requirements and cater for changing priorities, particularly under the current circumstances when most staff that would be required to relocate are performing multiple functions.

15. Today's global peacekeeping environment is marked by risk and volatility, where concurrent and competing priorities are routinely faced in the planning and management of peace operations. In the last two years, the Secretary-General was able to deploy multiple operations concurrently, largely owing to the stability, flexibility and above all the multi-tasking capacity in the present structures that allow for some movement of human and material support resources to meet the emerging operational requirements. The Secretary-General considers this capacity as a valuable resource built over time and is concerned that relocation could significantly degrade the Organization's capacity to rapidly deploy a mission in emergent circumstances.

16. A survey of UNLB showed clearly that the existing infrastructure available in Brindisi is totally inadequate to host the number of functions and staff associated with the proposed procurement and logistics hub. The deficiencies identified in UNLB by the consultants in terms of medical and education facilities are being remedied, to the extent possible, by the Secretariat. For example, an international school is planned to open later in 2005 to respond to the educational needs of the children of international staff, albeit only up to the age of 12 years. The impact of such initiatives upon retention of high-quality international staff for extended periods was factored into the external consultants' analyses.

17. The Secretary-General has concluded that a relocation of logistics and procurement functions from New York to UNLB is likely to have a significant negative impact on operational effectiveness. The consultants' findings support this conclusion.

18. The financial benefits from a relocation of the functions in question would be very limited with only modest savings in operating costs of less than 5 per cent and with a return-on-investment period of nine years. The financial case for UNLB over New York is further weakened by the current trend in United States dollar and euro exchange rates. The Secretary-General concludes that a relocation of the logistics and procurement functions to UNLB should not be considered due to the weak, and possibly negative financial impact of such a move. A financial sensitivity analysis is attached as annex III to the present report.

- **A new organizational structure for UNLB**
- **An identification of the issues to be addressed with the host country, such as legal, customs and immigration issues**
- **Development of a possible relocation master plan, depending on the outcome of the above, together with cost implications**

19. A relocation will require significant reorganization both at Headquarters and UNLB. A preliminary assessment of the potential division of functions and the relocation implementation plan is attached as annex IV to the report. A more detailed organizational structure for UNLB was not developed at this stage in light of the findings of this report.

20. While the overall relationship with the host Government is cordial and cooperative, the terms of the memorandum of understanding and the various domestic priorities of the region do place limitations on UNLB. This is particularly the case with regard to lead times for issuance of visas for training and other visits by United Nations officials who do not carry European Union passports.

IV. Comments of the UNLB Steering Committee

21. In its report (A/58/796), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions encouraged the incorporation of ideas and proposals from the UNLB Steering Committee. The Steering Committee welcomes the initiative of an in-depth study for a possible relocation of procurement and logistics functions to UNLB. The Committee notes, however, that the UNLB operations business case has changed and expanded over the years. UNLB was initially established at Brindisi to support the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and was subsequently well positioned to support the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). While UNPROFOR and UNMIBH have been liquidated and UNMIK is in the process of downsizing, in recent years UNLB has taken on increasing responsibilities to support 32 operations globally. The implementation of the strategic deployment stocks has added another dimension to UNLB operations, as described in the recent report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly (see A/59/701).

22. While the present report concludes that UNLB may not be suitable to host the additional logistics and procurement functions, the responsibilities of UNLB in support of global peacekeeping operations remain undiminished and indeed continue to evolve and grow. To that end it should be noted that certain development projects are proposed for UNLB as it assumes an increasingly important role in support of peace operations. Regardless of any decision on the relocation of Headquarters functions to UNLB, these projects are vital and valid and must be supported to ensure that global peacekeeping operations continue to receive adequate support.

V. Observations

23. The communication and information technology hub for the global peacekeeping communication network was established in 1996 at Brindisi. This location was chosen because of several unique geographical characteristics. Situated at the intersection of the footprints of all satellites utilized to provide communications to the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Brindisi provides a stable and well-positioned location for a global voice and data network hub, and its infrastructure has been leveraged and further developed to support the information and communication technology (ICT) global infrastructure. The central hub through which ICT services are administered ensures the continuous operation of the global network, and facilitates the effective management of resources across theatres of operation. Brindisi also hosts the ICT centrally managed help desk and the network control centre, providing round-the-clock technical support to field operations. The Secretary-General has also strengthened the disaster recovery capability through the establishment of an ICT disaster recovery infrastructure that leverages ICT facilities in UNLB to centrally secure the globally dispersed data assets. In this respect, the San Vito base located about 10 kilometres from Brindisi is being considered as a possible site for expanded peacekeeping communication requirements and for enhancing the Organization's disaster recovery capability.

24. The Secretary-General notes that the proposed relocation of elements of the procurement and logistics functions to UNLB does not follow evolving

peacekeeping support business practices. Peacekeeping logistics support concepts are now much more focused on the delivery of support capabilities than on the delivery of assets. Logistics managers are a critical element of the integrated operations, military and police staff working groups responsible for the mobilization and deployment of civilian and military personnel and equipment. The Secretariat's focus is moving towards the delivery of turnkey service solutions such as electrical power rather than generators, and fuel rather than fuel storage systems. As such, the need to locate procurement and logistics experts, or support managers, with equipment is of decreasing relevance. It is much more operationally efficient to have these technical experts near the decision makers who establish peacekeeping operational objectives so that matching support capabilities are generated and deployed in real time to meet changing operational challenges.

25. The Secretary-General will continue to review functions currently performed in missions that might lend themselves to being centralized at Headquarters in New York, at UNLB in Brindisi or elsewhere.

VI. Conclusions

26. The Secretary-General concludes that a relocation of procurement and operational logistics functions to UNLB is likely to have a significant negative impact on operational effectiveness. The financial case for such a move, as highlighted by the information provided in this report, is weak to negative.

27. Furthermore, the Secretary-General is concerned that removal of critical logistics functions from the existing highly integrated structures in the Secretariat would have a serious negative impact on the overall capacity of the Organization to rapidly and effectively deploy new missions and to provide efficient logistical support to the 32 ongoing peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations.

VII. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

28. The General Assembly is requested to take note of the present report.

Annex I*

Functions that could be transferred to UNLB

Functional category	*Examples/illustrations of activities*	*Finding and rationale*
1. Helping to define mission parameters and objectives	• Logistics operations planning functions in Occupational Support Service • Specialist Support Service and Communication and Information Technology Service input into overall mission parameters from a technical feasibility standpoint	Retain in Headquarters • Activities in this category require intense and regular interactions with multiple key Headquarters-based stakeholders, e.g., Member States, Force Generation Service, etc.
2. Defining necessary capabilities	• Initial needs assessment and reconnaissance • Mission resource planning and budget formulation • Setting equipment standards and policies	Mostly retain in Headquarters • Mostly happens as a continuation of the mission definition process • Handover from previous step would be very difficult if relocated
3. Deriving technical specifications, requisitioning, delivering them	• Monitor and assess requirements • Develop specifications • Place requisition • Conduct technical evaluations • Negotiating contingent-owned equipment memorandums of understanding	Relocate to consolidated hub • Relatively limited linkages to other Headquarters functions assuming good handover of capability requirements from planning phase
4. Procuring required goods and services	• Full process of procurement involving Procurement Service, Office of Legal Affairs and accounts payable concluding in payment to vendors upon delivery	Relocate to consolidated hub • Co-location of requisitioners and procurement services is crucial due to their heavy interdependencies • Any case for relocating requisitioners therefore translates into a similar move of procurement (for more detail, see para. 7 of main report)

* Direct excerpts from the report of external consultant.

Functional category	*Examples/illustrations of activities*	*Finding and rationale*
5. Managing assets and providing ongoing support to missions	• Manage centralized contracts • Design technical training programmes • Provide technical advice to missions • Receive and inspect goods and services • Maintain comprehensive records on assets of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (including strategic deployment stocks)	Mostly relocate to consolidated hub • Limited linkage to other Headquarters functions • Depending on location, the consolidated hub could offer greater operational proximity in terms of time-zone alignment for ongoing support • Some inventory management functions may need to stay in Headquarters due to ties to Headquarters oversight bodies and relatively limited daily linkages with rest of logistics
6. Management and oversight functions	• Reporting on activities to Headquarters oversight bodies as requested (including audit responses) • Internal administrative and support activities (e.g., maintaining records, monitoring staff, internal skill-building and training, etc.)	Split between locations • Most ongoing oversight and management will go with unit • Some liaison capacity must be retained in Headquarters to link to oversight bodies and other Headquarters stakeholders
7. Other functions	• Communications and Information Technology Service: information technology and communication support services for all of Department of Peacekeeping Operations • Air Safety Unit: Air safety oversight for all of United Nations including large Department of Peacekeeping Operations component • Specialist Support Service: Requisitioning and technical support to Headquarters functions of Department of Peacekeeping Operations and others (e.g., medical, air transport)	Split between locations • Pragmatic split done on a case-by-case basis due to wide variation in types of activities • Where there is no strong Headquarters linkage, default is to relocate and shift overall centre of gravity to consolidated hub

Annex II*

Matrix of the advantages and disadvantages of the transfer and its impact on the activities of the related departments, divisions and other clients involved with the functions

Impact area	*Factor*	*Advantages*	*Disadvantages*
Operational effectiveness			
Impact of separation of functions for relocation (on balance, positive)	Separation of strategic and operational logistics support functions	• Clearer separation of roles across Logistics Support Division services • Dedicated focus on optimization of operational logistics support	• Need for coordination between strategic and operational hubs
	Organization of logistics and procurement functions	• Relocated functions aligned to ensure integration	• Potential need for some duplication of management and support functions
	Service to Headquarters clients	• Functions with strongest linkages to Headquarters will remain in New York City	• Steps required to maintain benefits of consolidated procurement function
Impact of relocating functions to Brindisi (significantly negative)	Geographical position	• Improved service with greater time zone overlap with missions	• No synergies with other United Nations departments, agencies • At least one stopover for travel to New York and missions
	Ability to attract and retain staff		• High staff turnover and long lead time in filling vacancies, owing to lack of spousal employment options, poorer welfare and services, staff compensation • Limited pool of top candidates for General Service positions

* Direct excerpts from the report of external consultant.

Impact area	*Factor*	*Advantages*	*Disadvantages*
	Conditions offered by host country		• Restrictions on working permits for General Service staff and spouses; need to replace all General Service staff as part of relocation • Occasional difficulty in obtaining visas for visitors
	Facilities	• Clear strengths of location and facilities from a security standpoint due to co-location with Italian military in a generally secure region	• Need for significant investment in upgrade • Lead time for construction or refurbishment
	Business impact:		
	Procurement		• Low synergies with other agencies
	Transport		• Limited access to commercial transport networks
	Training	• Good for simulations and exercises, low level of distractions for trainees	
	Transitional		• Need for significant reorganization and re-engineering
Cost-effectiveness (weak to negative impact)	Staff costs	• Limited savings on General Service salaries and Professional allowances	• Professional assignment grants higher with greater turnover • Cost of recruitment higher
	Other operating costs	• Some savings on rent and travel costs	
	Investment		• Significant investment required to prepare site and relocate staff without disruption to service

Annex III*

Financial sensitivity analysis

Variable	*Potential variance*	*Impact on financial case (base case only)*
Dollar-to-euro exchange rate Assumed: 1.36 (exchange rate of 27 December 2004)	High: +20% = 1.63	Investment: $11.9M (+9%) Cost savings: $1.0M (-33%) Years to payback: 16 (+7 yrs)
	Low: -20% = 1.08	Investment: $9.8M (-9%) Cost savings: $2.0M (+33%) Years to payback: 6 (-3 yrs)
Projected average staff tenure after relocation to Brindisi Assumed: 30 months (current average tenure is 23 months)	High: 36 months	Investment: No impact Cost savings: $1.7M (+13%) Years to payback: 8 (-1 yr)
	Low: 24 months	Investment: No impact Cost savings: $1.2M (-20%) Years to payback: 12 (+3 yrs)
Potential increase in total staff due to permanent duplication in management and support functions Assumed: None	High: 10% (-13 posts)	Investment: $10.6M (-2%) Cost savings: -$0.1M (-108%) Years to payback: No break-even
	Low: 5% (-7 posts)	Investment: $10.7M (-1%) Cost savings: $0.7M (-54%) Years to payback: 25 (+16 yrs)
Duration of temporary duplications in total staff during transition Assumed: 6 months	High: 12 months	Investment: $12.8 (+18%) Cost savings: No impact Years to payback: 11 (+2 yrs)
	Low: 3 months	Investment: $9.8M (-9%) Cost savings: No impact Years to payback: 8 (-1 yr)
Cost of setting up new premises in Brindisi Assumed: $5M	High: +100% = $10M	Investment: $15.8M (+46%) Cost savings: No impact Years to payback: 14 (+5 yrs)
	Low: -50% = $2.5M	Investment: $8.3M (-23%) Cost savings: No impact Years to payback: 7 (-2 yrs)

* Direct excerpts from the report of external consultant.

Annex IV*

Potential division of functions and preliminary timeline for relocation

A. Potential future division of functions between UNHQ and hub

Impacted unit	UNHQ functional clusters	Consolidated Logistics Hub functional clusters
OSS	*Logistics planning team* • Setting overall mission parameters and objectives (with other DPKO, TCC etc)	*Logistics support center* • MovCon for UNOE • SDS coordination
SSS and CITS (Logistics)	• Technical input to mission planning and resource allocation	• Develop detailed requirements and requisitioning • Monitor delivery of goods and services by vendors • Manage assets and provide ongoing support and backstopping to missions
CITS (Tech support)	*HQ CIT support and liaison* • Support to HQ DPKO users • Coordination with ITSD • Requirements identification for some applications	*Communications IT hub* • Global communications and disaster recovery management • Development and testing of some new applications
Procurement	*UNHQ Procurement* • Procurement for UNHQ units • Some select Peacekeeping procurement • Linkage to oversight bodies	*Peacekeeping procurement hub* • Majority of Peacekeeping mission procurement • Necessary HCC, Legal and Accounts Payable support capacity
Others	• N/A	*Mission support hub* • Civilian Training center

B. Timeline for relocation over up to five years

PRELIMINARY



* Direct excerpts from the report of external consultant.

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Fifty- ninth session
Agenda item 106
Financial reports and audited financial statements, and reports of the Board of Auditors

Report on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors concerning United Nations peacekeeping operations for the financial period ended 30 June 2004

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides additional information in response to the recommendations of the Board of Auditors as contained in its report on the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the period ended 30 June 2004 (A/59/5, vol. II). The report is submitted in accordance with paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 48/216 B, in which the Secretary-General was requested to report to the Assembly at the same time as the Board of Auditors submitted its recommendations to the Assembly, on measures taken or to be taken to implement those recommendations.

Given that the Administration has concurred with many of the Board's recommendations and that most of the comments of the Secretary-General have been duly reflected in the report of the Board of Auditors, the present report addresses only those recommendations that require further comments from the Administration.

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I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 7 of its resolution 48/216 B the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to report to it on the measures that would be taken to implement the recommendations of the Board of Auditors at the same time that the report of the Board was submitted to the Assembly. Accordingly, the present report is submitted in response to the recommendations of the Board of Auditors contained in its report on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the 12-month period ending 30 June 2004.

2. In preparing the present report, account was taken of the provisions of the following General Assembly resolutions:

(a) Resolution 50/204 A (in particular, para. 4, regarding implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors approved by the General Assembly);

(b) Resolution 51/225, section A, (in particular, para. 10, regarding the timetable for the implementation of recommendations of the Board of Auditors);

(c) Resolution 52/212 B (in particular, paras. 2 to 5) and the note by the Secretary-General transmitting the proposals of the Board for improving the implementation of its recommendations approved by the Assembly (A/52/753, annex);

(d) Resolution 56/233 B (in particular para. 3 thereof), in which the Assembly endorsed the recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/56/887, para. 11) on the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General on the Board of Auditors report.

3. The implementation of the majority of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors falls under the responsibility of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. The remainder are the responsibility of the Department of Management, specifically the Assistant Secretaries-General for the Office of Central Support Services, the Office of Programme, Planning, Budget and Accounts and the Office of Human Resources Management.

II. Implementation of the recommendations contained in the report of the Board of Auditors[1]

4. **In paragraph 71 of the report of the Board of Auditors, it recommended that the Administration should ensure that proper bank and cash management processes are in place.**

5. The Administration continues to take action to ensure that proper banking services are in place. The request to close the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) account maintained with the Banking and Payments Authority of Kosovo was issued on 2 December 2004. The banking services agreement between the United Nations and Standard Chartered Bank signed on 8 October 2004 provides banking services for the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI).

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 5* (A/59/5), vol. II.

6. The United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) has confirmed that all bank reconciliation statements, with the exception of the United States dollar account with the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, were performed in a timely manner and made available to the auditors. Concerning the account with the Commercial Bank of Eritrea, the Mission explained that since it has no access to the network of the bank, the practice is that the bank statements are received at the end of the following month. This practice accounts for the one month delay in the preparation of the bank reconciliation statements. The United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has segregated the duties over the functions of receipt, custody and recording of cash transactions to facilitate the operation of sound internal checks. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has improved physical controls and security measures at the cashier's office. The doors to the cashier's office and vault are now under lock and key. Surprise cash counts, which are now part of the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Chief Finance Officer, are performed periodically.

7. **In paragraph 122, the Board recommended that the Administration should expedite the development of the database to enable the proper monitoring and control of on-the-job aviation training.**

8. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has expanded the scope of the database to include monitoring and control of regular and on-the-job training programmes in all six sections of the Specialist Support Service, Logistics Support Division. The Department anticipates launching this project by 31 March 2005.

9. **In paragraph 149, the Board recommended that the Administration should expedite implementation of the aircraft tracking system at the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and assess the feasibility of implementing it at other missions.**

10. The implementation of the tracking system was delayed because MONUC was conducting an evaluation of the compatibility of the United Nations bandwidth and the software used to receive the polling data for tracking of aircraft. The aircraft tracking system has been installed in January 2005 and a further enhancement of the system is in progress. The feasibility of introducing this system in other missions is dependent on the results of MONUC's evaluation.

11. **In paragraph 167, the Board recommended and the Administration agreed to implement the strategic deployment stocks accounting guidelines without any undue delay.**

12. The strategic deployment stocks accounting guidelines are being applied as a pilot project in accounting for strategic deployment stocks issued to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMIS).

13. **In paragraph 180, the Board recommended and the Administration agreed to expedite the promulgation and implementation of its strategic deployment stocks policies and procedures as a matter of priority.**

14. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has created a comprehensive set of draft policies and procedures regarding the management of strategic deployment stocks. The compendium, which is currently under review, will be submitted for approval in April 2005.

15. **In paragraph 203, the Board recommended and the Administration agreed to review in detail the rations management standard operating procedures of missions to ensure that they are in line with the Rations Management Manual.**

16. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has received and is reviewing the standard operating procedures for five missions with rations contracts and is following up on the submission from the remaining five missions.

17. **In paragraph 222, the Board recommended and the Administration agreed to maintain proper and complete records of all rations written off to facilitate the monitoring of obsolete and excessive rations as well as spoilage levels in order to utilize this information to identify problem areas where corrective actions should be taken.**

18. The guidelines of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on food stock control have been targeted at avoiding the potential accumulation of surplus stocks which could lead to food obsolescence, pilferage and spoilage. Furthermore, the Department has developed provisional guidelines and standard operating procedures to better manage and control rations in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Notwithstanding, the Department will request missions to submit monthly reports on cases of rations written off.

19. **In paragraph 244, citing specific instances at UNMEE, the Board recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations strictly enforce compliance with the administrative instructions relating to the payment of allowances at special rates.**

20. The policy relating to the payment of daily subsistence allowance at special rates contained in the *Human Resources Handbook* is very clear. Special rates are to be paid on the certification by the director of administration/chief administrative officer that good commercial hotels are not available in a mission area. The Administrative Support Division will remind UNMEE to enforce the established procedures relating to the payment of special rates.

21. **In paragraph 248, the Board recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations review the relevance of the purchase of top-of-the-line equipment with a view to preventing the recurrence of expenditures not in line with financial constraints and technical needs.**

22. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations wishes to reiterate that the Board's findings relating to the requisition of 15 GSM mobile telephones were not factual as their specifications were generic and not a straight copy of the main features of a specific manufacturer. The Department concurs with the recommendation regarding the relevance of the purchase and actual use of the top-of-the-line mobile telephone at the field missions. However, it should be noted that in most cases mobile telephones are tied in with the services available locally. That being the case, the Department has not been able to use one single make or model of mobile telephone for all field missions. The Department will request all field missions to conduct a cost-benefit analysis prior to making decisions concerning the acquisition of mobile te'ephones.

23. **In paragraphs 251 and 253, the Board recommended that the Administration should:**

(a) **Establish a time frame for the finalization of the promulgation and implementation of the guidelines on ethical principles for United Nations staff working in the procurement process;**

(b) **Finalize and expedite the promulgation and implementation of a code of conduct for suppliers to the United Nations.**

24. The Department of Management has completed its analysis. A draft of the guidelines for ethical conduct and a bulletin governing rules on the conduct of staff have been transmitted to the Office of Legal Affairs for review. The bulletin will promulgate special rules applicable to all staff engaged in procurement activities. As required by the Staff Rules, the text will be submitted to staff representatives for their comments prior to finalization and promulgation. It is expected that the document will be finalized by May 2005. A supplier's code of conduct has also been drafted with the assistance of a consultant. Further analysis on the design of guidelines for implementation is ongoing.

25. **In paragraph 272, the Board recommended that the Administration consider the feasibility of compliance by missions with the Procurement Manual in respect of local vendor review committees vendor database officers with a view to revising the Manual, if appropriate, while ensuring proper controls and accountability.**

26. In addition to the comments of the Administration reflected in paragraph 271 of the Board's report, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will inform the concerned missions of the decision of the Procurement Service for compliance.

27. **In paragraph 274, the Board encouraged the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, in conjunction with the Procurement Service, continue to monitor and address causes for excessive procurement lead times at peacekeeping missions.**

28. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations welcomed the recommendation and wishes to acknowledge the efforts of Procurement Service that have resulted in the reduction of lead times. In addition to establishing system contracts and improved procurement planning, the Department will continue to work with Procurement Service to explore ways of further reducing procurement lead times at peacekeeping missions.

29. **In paragraph 283, the Board recommended that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations properly plan, coordinate and monitor centrally all reviews and periodic management assessments of peacekeeping missions.**

30. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations clarified that management assessments of peacekeeping missions are centrally planned, coordinated and monitored by the Military Division. Between January 2003 and December 2004, assessment missions have been fielded to the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), UNMIK, UNMEE and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). These assessments are carried out with the support from other offices of the Department. In addition, each office periodically carries out its own assessment of its specific operation in the missions. For example, the Office of Mission Support centrally plans and coordinatesUnited Nations Organization

Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo biannual reviews of all missions to assess the status of support provided. The Assistant-Secretary-General of the Office of Mission Support chairs these assessment reviews.

31. **In paragraph 289, the Board recommended that the Administration finalize in a timely manner all reviews undertaken by management to ensure the relevance of the findings reported, even if this means reporting on disagreements.**

32. As confirmed by the Board, many of the recommendations contained in the report on the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) management review were considered during the preparation of the Mission's budget for 2004/2005. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations has streamlined the management review process to ensure that reports of the reviews are issued in a timely manner. The Military Division monitors and follows up on the recommendations of the reviews.

33. **In paragraph 314, the Board recommended that the Administration expedite the necessary amendments on the Integrated Management Information System regarding leave management within a predetermined time frame.**

34. The gaps analysis was completed during the last quarter of 2003. In June 2004, the IMIS Steering Committee approved the project and asked that a detailed project plan be prepared. The proposed project plan was prepared and is awaiting review and finalization by the different offices involved.

35. **In paragraph 316, the Board reiterated its recommendation that the Administration expedite the finalizing and aligning of the generic job profiles and grading guidelines to eliminate any inconsistencies and disparities in the application of entry rules and grading of employees.**

36. Further to the comments contained in paragraph 317 of the Board's report, the grading profiles and grading guidelines were finalized and approved on 30 July 2004. The Office of Human Resources Management and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are working closely to finalize the review of functional titles and to complete related generic job profiles.

37. In paragraph 332, the Board recommended that the Administration, in consultation with the administrations of other United Nations entities, institutionalize the reporting of disciplinary and judicial action taken or to be taken against military and civilian personnel for serious misconduct and crime, including reporting on the status and nature of such actions.

38. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations concurs with the recommendation that the United Nations and its funds and programmes should have a data base enabling it to track progress on all allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse and all other types of misconduct, serious misconduct or crime resulting in disciplinary and/or judicial action. The Department hesitates to use the term "serious misconduct" as this has different and defined meanings for uniformed and civilian personnel. The Department is undertaking a comprehensive strategy to address the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse and will consult with other United Nations entities on this matter.

39. **In paragraph 334, the Board recommended that the Administration continue with its efforts to improve the timely finalization of memoranda of understanding.**

40. As communicated to the Board, the finalization of memoranda of understanding is largely dependent upon the legislative process of each troop-contributing country and therefore the rate of progress in signing memoranda of understanding was often dependent on factors beyond the control of the Department.

41. **In paragraph 343, the Board recommended that the Administration ensure that clear and coordinated direction and advice be given by Headquarters to missions during their liquidation phase to promote efficient liquidation.**

42. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations concurs with the recommendation. The Department provides clear and coordinated direction as a mission undergoes liquidation. Missions in liquidation phase are guided by the Liquidation Manual (approved in June 2003), which contains the necessary guidelines, instructions and standard operating procedures to be followed. Additional directives are given by the Department as and when necessary in order to facilitate an efficient liquidation process. Concerning the liquidation of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), most of the noted weaknesses were mainly due to the deteriorating security conditions in Iraq, which affected decisions expected to be made by United Nations Headquarters.

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Agenda item 55
Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit

Letter dated 16 February 2005 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain and Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

We are pleased to hereby enclose the text of the statement issued on 17 January last in Mexico City by the member countries of the Group of Friends for the reform of the United Nations, encompassing Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain and Sweden (see annex). The main purpose of our meeting in Mexico was the examination of the Group's future activities regarding the promotion of the reform of the United Nations in the light of the report entitled "A more secure world: our shared responsibility", prepared by the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

We would highly appreciate your kind assistance in issuing the statement of the Group of Friends for the reform as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55.

(*Signed*) Abdallah **Baali**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Algeria

(*Signed*) John **Dauth**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Australia

(*Signed*) Allan **Rock**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Canada

(*Signed*) Heraldo **Muñoz**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Chile

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(*Signed*) María Angela **Holguín**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Colombia

(*Signed*) Gunter **Pleuger**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Germany

(*Signed*) Kenzo **Oshima**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Japan

(*Signed*) Judith Mbula **Bahemuka**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Kenya

(*Signed*) Enrique **Berruga Filloy**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Mexico

(*Signed*) Dirk Jan **van den Berg**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

(*Signed*) Don **MacKay**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of New Zealand

(*Signed*) Munir **Akram**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Pakistan

(*Signed*) Vanu Gopala **Menon**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Singapore

(*Signed*) Juan Antonio **Yañez-Barnuevo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Spain

(*Signed*) Anders **Lidén**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Sweden

Annex to the letter dated 16 February 2005 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain and Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Group of Friends for the reform of the United Nations*

Mexico City, 17 January 2005

The Group of Friends held its fifth meeting in Mexico City to continue its endeavours in promoting the reform of the United Nations and to examine its future activities in the light of the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.

The Group exchanged views on the various topics of the report of the High-level Panel. It expressed its appreciation to the members of the Panel and recognized the solid basis that the report provides to the discussions on the reform of the United Nations that will be held in the following months.

The Group also considered proposals of reform made by individual members and shared the view that revitalizing the United Nations and enhancing its capabilities require reforms in the operation of its bodies, funds and programmes. Ways and means to improve coordination within the United Nations system were also addressed by the Group.

The Group is aware of the publication of another report that will complement the work of the High-level Panel and bring new ideas to the discussions, namely, the Sachs report (*Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*).

The Group looks forward to the report of the Secretary-General in March and his proposals for a comprehensive approach to security and development, and the link between the two, and notes the Secretary-General's critical role in generating political support for strong outcomes on United Nations reform.

The Group reaffirmed its commitment to a more effective multilateralism and to the United Nations as the core multilateral organization for promoting collective security and international cooperation. The United Nations deserves our full support and the Group recognized the invaluable role that it performs and should continue to perform.

The Group stressed that collective security is a comprehensive concept involving all threats to mankind and expressed its support to the multidimensional approach contained in the report. It underlined that the United Nations must be ready and able to face all threats to collective security.

* Algeria, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sweden.

After exchanging views on the role that the Group of Friends can play to promote the reform of the United Nations, the Group identified several actions that can be achieved and concluded that the following approaches and actions constitute a common position of its members:

- 2005 is a crucial year to achieve tangible results for the benefit of the United Nations as a whole. The Group is committed to mobilizing political action in favour of a comprehensive reform of the United Nations.
- The reform should correspond to today's challenges in order to address them in a legitimate and effective way.
- Enhancing the preventive capabilities of the Organization is central to any system aimed at avoiding the emergence of situations that may put international peace and security at risk.
- Economic and social development, as outlined in the Millennium Development Goals, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the Johannesburg Declaration and the Doha Declaration, and international cooperation are key elements of a preventive approach to collective security.
- In order to build towards a comprehensive reform the Group will focus first on those proposals and recommendations that enjoy wide support and do not require amendments to the Charter of the United Nations.
- The Group of Friends, individually and collectively, will share its views and proposals with all Member States at all levels in order to build a common approach towards the reform of the United Nations. It will also coordinate its efforts with the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly.
- Members of the Group will promote the Group's views and proposals within their regions, including through regional organizations, to promote the strongest support towards an action-oriented High-level Meeting of Heads of State and Government to be held in September 2005, as decided by the General Assembly in resolution 59/145.
- Legislative bodies and civil society should be involved in the process leading to a successful High-level Meeting of Heads of State and Government.

Members of the Group decided to meet as frequently as necessary and expressed their willingness to submit to the wider membership of the United Nations, through the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, a number of proposals based on their discussions.

The Group agreed to develop simultaneously those proposals on the basis of an initial list of issues, including the following: prevention of conflicts and the peaceful settlement of disputes, the struggle against terrorism, the fight against poverty, economic and social development and the follow-up to the Monterrey Consensus, health and infectious diseases, environmental degradation, responsibility to protect, the establishment of a peacebuilding commission, the reform of the Commission on Human Rights, institutional reform of the main United Nations organs, particularly the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat, as well as the relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations.

The Group expressed its appreciation to the Government of Mexico for its hospitality.

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Programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005

Administration of justice at the United Nations

Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

Administration of justice in the Secretariat

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the cost implications of the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services following its management review of the appeals process, issued in document A/59/408.

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1. The report of the Secretary-General on the administration of justice in the Secretariat (A/59/449) addresses, inter alia, the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services following its management review of the appeals process which was conducted in response to General Assembly resolution 57/307, and issued in document A/59/408. Noting the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services for additional resources to be allocated to the organizational units involved in the appeals process, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested that the General Assembly be provided with the cost implications of those recommendations.

2. For the biennium 2004-2005, the estimated resource requirements stemming from the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services are set out in the annex. In summary, they are as follows:

(a) For the Office of Human Resources Management: $177,800 for general temporary assistance, for eliminating the current backlog in conducting administrative reviews and preparing respondents' replies to the Joint Appeals Board;

(b) For the Geneva and Nairobi Joint Appeals Boards: $133,900 and $106,900, respectively, for general temporary assistance, for eliminating the current backlog in processing and considering appeals;

(c) For the Office of the Under-Secretary-General: $13,500, for general temporary assistance, for eliminating the backlog in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management and for updating the electronic Case and Jurisprudence Digest of Administrative Tribunal Judgements;

(d) For training: $30,000, to be used as start-up costs for training the members of all Joint Appeals Boards (New York, Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi).

3. The total cost for addressing and eliminating the backlog amounts to $462,100. This amount will be accommodated from within existing 2004-2005 resources and will thus not entail additional appropriations.

4. Additional resource requirements for the biennium 2006-2007 amount to $1,021,600. They are set out in the annex and include the following: 1 P-5 and 1 P-3 for the New York Joint Appeals Board; 1 P-4 for the Panel of Counsel; 1 P-3 for the Administrative Law Unit in the Office of Human Resources Management; the upgrading of a P-2 post to P-3 (Deputy Secretary) for the Geneva Joint Appeals Board; 1 P-3 for the Vienna Joint Appeals Board; and 12 months of general temporary assistance for the Nairobi Joint Appeals Board. The resources requested for additional general temporary assistance in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Management ($27,000) and for training ($30,000) are proposed to be accommodated from existing resources, including training resources.

5. The total additional resource requirements of $964,600 ($1,021,600 less $57,000) for the biennium 2006-2007 represent recurring requirements needed to keep cases current and within time limits, thus complying with existing time limits and with the new timelines recommended by the Office of Internal Oversight Services in its management review. The Organization's compliance with time limits will effectively address the recurring complaint by appellants concerning the chronic delays in the recourse system and will further address the Tribunal's criticism of such delays and its awards of compensation therefor. These resource

estimates will be submitted to the General Assembly in the context of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2006-2007 and the peacekeeping account for the period 2005-2006. All efforts will be made to identify offsetting amounts within other areas of the budget to ensure that these proposals would not call for additional resources for the Organization as a whole.

Annex

Cost implications of the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services in connection with its management review of the appeals process (A/59/408)

(United States dollars)

Organizational unit involved	*Recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/59/408)*	*Expected accomplishment*	*Planned indicators of achievement*	*Estimated general temporary assistance costs*	*Estimated costs for posts*
Administrative Law Unit/Office of Human Resources Management	P-3, Legal Officer	Regularization of current temporary arrangement in order to respond effectively to statutory deadlines and prevent accumulation of backlog (para. 32 and recommendation 8)	**All cases current and within time limits** (once backlog has been eliminated with the general temporary assistance). No risk of the Tribunal ordering payment of damages for delays in submitting the respondents' replies to the Joint Appeals Board	-	131 100
	General temporary assistance at the P-3 level for 16 work months	**Elimination of the current backlog** in responding to requests for review and preparation of respondents' replies (para. 32 and recommendation 8)	**All cases current and within time limits**. No more payment of damages for delays, ordered by United Nations Administrative Tribunal.	177 800	-
Joint Appeals Board/New York	P-5, Presiding Officer	Regularization of current temporary assignment of a full-time Presiding Officer and Chairperson in order to continue streamlining and expediting the work of the Joint Appeals Board (para. 35 and recommendation 9)	**Taking of decisions on procedures without delay**, smooth and efficient processing of an increased number of New York Joint Appeals Board cases and chairing of meetings	-	185 800
	P-3, Legal Officer	Provision of additional capacity to enable Joint Appeals Board to maintain workload once the current backlog is eliminated (para. 34 and recommendation 9)	**All cases current and within time limits.** No more payment of damages for delays ordered by United Nations Administrative Tribunal	-	131 100
Joint Appeals Board/Geneva	P-3, Deputy Secretary	Upgrading of an existing P-2 post to P-3 to deputize for the Secretary (paras. 37-38 and recommendation 10)	**Enhancement of productivity**, smooth and efficient processing of Geneva Joint Appeals Board cases and retention of institutional memory	-	57 800

Organizational unit involved	*Recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/59/408)*	*Expected accomplishment*	*Planned indicators of achievement*	*Estimated general temporary assistance costs*	*Estimated costs for posts*
	General temporary assistance at the P-3 level for 12 work months	**Elimination of current backlog** (paras. 37-38 and recommendation 10)	**All cases current and within time limits**	133 900	-
Joint Appeals Board/Vienna	P-3, Secretary	Establishment of a functioning full-time Joint Appeals Board Secretary (paras. 40-41 and recommendation 11)	**Enhancement of productivity**, smooth and efficient processing of Vienna Joint Appeals Board cases, establishment of case-management and tracking systems and assistance to other Joint Appeals Board secretariats, as needed	-	121 600
	G-5 (part-time), Administrative Assistant	Provision of administrative support to the Joint Appeals Board Secretary (paras. 40-41 and recommendation 11)	Maintenance of files and database, handling of routine correspondence, scheduling of meetings, tracking adherence to deadlines	-	70 800
Joint Appeals Board/Nairobi	General temporary assistance at the P-2 level for 24 work months	**Elimination of current backlog** and establishment of case-management and tracking system (paras. 45-46 and recommendation 12)	**All cases current and within time limits.** Effective case management system established	106 900	106 900
Panel of Counsel	P-4, Legal Officer	Provision of legal backstopping to the Panel of Counsel in New York and the other headquarters duty stations (paras. 48-51 and recommendation 13)	**Professional legal representation for staff; increased chances of early settlement**. Assistance given to Panels of Counsel in the other headquarters duty stations, as needed	-	159 500
Office of the Under-Secretary-General/ Department of Management	General temporary assistance at the P-4 level for 1 work month each year	Elimination of backlog. Annual updating and maintenance of electronic Case and Jurisprudence Digest of United Nations Administrative Tribunal judgements (para. 52 report)	**All cases current and within time limits.** All new judgements analysed and entered into the database in a timely fashion	13 500	27 000[a]

Organizational unit involved	*Recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (A/59/408)*	*Expected accomplishment*	*Planned indicators of achievement*	*Estimated general temporary assistance costs*	*Estimated costs for posts*
Office of Human Resources Management	Training to be provided to Joint Appeals Board/Joint Disciplinary Committee members at each headquarters duty station on an annual basis	Reports from Joint Appeals Boards that take account of the Organization's rules and policies leading to increased transparency and predictability in the appeals stage of the internal recourse system (paras. 58-61 and recommendation 15)	**Increased acceptance by the Secretary-General of unanimous recommendations of the Joint Appeals Boards**	30 000	30 000*
					1 021 600
					less
					57 000*
			Total	**462 100*** (non-recurrent)	**964 600** (recurrent)

* These requirements will be met from within existing resources.